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NEUMAN AND BEYOND:
INCOME SPLITTING, TAX AVOIDANCE, AND
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN THE SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA
David G. Duff*
I. INTRODUOION
Under a progressive income tax such as that in Canada, where
tax applies to the income received by individuals rather than aggre-
gate amounts received by spouses or larger family units', taxpayers
have an incentive to shift income to lower-income spouses or
children, thereby minimizing the amount of income subject to tax
at higher marginal rates of tax and maximizing the availability of
personal exemptions that exclude a minimum amount of income
from tax- altogether.' Though an income tax might reasonably re-
spect some or all of these transfers, basing tax on each individual's
* Assistant Professor, Faculty ofLaw, University ofToronto.
1. The federal rates appearin s. 117(2) of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.)
(as amended) (hereafter the "ITA"), and are currently 17% of the first $29,590 of taxable
income, 26% of the next $29,590 of taxable income, and 29% of taxable income
exceeding $59,180. Provincial taxes, as well as federal and provincial surtaxes, add to
the progressivity of this rate structure. Personal exemptions appear in s. 118(1) ofthe ITA,
which provides a credit against federal tax payable equal to 17% of $6,794 ($1,555) in
the case of an individual taxpayer, a further credit up to 17% of $5,718 ($972) for
taxpayers supporting a cohabiting spouse or wholly dependent person, and a separate
credit equal to 17% of $6,456 for each adult who is dependent on the taxpayer because
of mental or physical infirmity. Since the additional credits for spouses and wholly
dependent persons are less than the amount of the single credit, and there is no general
credit for dependent children, the aggregate value of these personal exemptions can be
maximized by ensuring that the annual income of each family member is at least $6,794.
With the combined effect of the dividend gross-up and tax credit in s. 82(l)(b) and s. 121,
moreover, individuals can receive up to $26,640 of taxable dividends without paying tax.
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legal entitlement to income received,2 the Canadian tax system has
generally opposed such income splitting, attributing income from
property transferred to a spouse or minor child back to the taxpayer
from whom the property is transferred,3 and taxing transfers of
property under Gift and Estate Taxes imposed at the federal level
prior to 1972.4
Among the various rules attributing amounts received by one
taxpayer to another is s. 56(2) of the Income TaxAct, according to
which:
A payment or transfer of property made pursuant to the direction of, or with
the concurrence of, a taxpayer to some other person for the benefit of the
taxpayer or as a benefit that the taxpayer desired to have conferred on the
other person ... shall be included in computing the taxpayer's income to the
2. See, e.g., Peter W. Hogg and Joanne E. Magee, Principles ofCanadian Income Tax Law
(Scarborough: Carswell, 1995) at p. 103, suggesting that:
It is arguable ... that the logic of accepting the individual as the tax unit should be
carried forward to the elimination of the attrib.ution rules. After all, the tax saving
caused by income splitting is purchased at the price of a legal divestment of the
income-earning property in favour of another individual; It is true that the transferee
is, we are assuming, a member of the transferor's family, but if the arguments in
favour of the individual as the tax unit are valid, it is not silly to treat the transferor's
loss of legal title to and control over income as having tax consequences. Moreover,
the repeal of the attribution rules would provide an incentive to property-owners to
share their property with spouses and children, which might contribute in some smaIl
way to a more equitable distribution of wealth, especially to women, who often lack
the same opportunity to accumulate wealth as men.
3. See s. 74.1 (1) and (2) ofthe rrA, which deem any income orloss from property transferred
or loaned to a spouse or minor child or property substituted therefor to be that of the
transferor or lender and not that of the recipient. See also s. 248(5)(a), which deems
property substituted for substituted property to be substituted property, the attribution
rule for capital gains and losses on property transferred or loaned to a spouse in s. 74.2,
and s. 75.1 which applies to certain transfers of farm property to a minor child. The first
attribution rule appeared in s. 4(4) of the Income War Tax Act, S.C. 1917, c. 28, according
to which:
A person who, after the first day of August, 1917, has reduced his income by the
transfer or assignment of any real or personal.. movable or immovable property, t6
such person's wife or husband, as the case may be, or to any member of the family of
such person, shall, nevertheless, be liable to be taxed as if such transfer or assignment
had not been made, unless the Minister is satisfied that such transfer or assignment
was not made for the purpose of evading the taxes imposed under this Act or any part
thereof. .
4. See Part IV of the Income TaxAct, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148; and Estate TaxAct, R.S.C. 1970,
c. E-9. When the Gift Tax was first introduced in 1935, the Minister of Finance explained
that the tax was being imposed "primarily to operate as a deterrent to transfers of property
~y gift, chiefly within family groups which would have the effect of reducing personal
Income to lower brackets and thus securing income tax assessment at rates lower than
would otherwise be applicable". See House ofCommons Debates (1935), vol. 2, p. 1986.
I
extent that it would be if the payment or transfer had been made to the
taxpayer.
This rule, originally enacted as s. 16(1) of the 1948 Income Tax
Act,S attempts to prevent the diversion of income by a taxpayer to
another person, either for the taxpayer's benefit or the benefit of that
other person, by including the amount paid or transferred to the
other person "to the extent that it would be if the payment or transfer
had been made to the taxpayer". In this respect, as courts and
commentators have noted, it codifies a doctrine of indirect or con-
structive receipt according to which an amount that would be in-
cluded in a taxpayer's income if received by the taxpayer is taxable
to. the taxpayer if it is diverted to another person for the taxpayer's
benefit or the benefit of that other person.6
5. S.C. 1948, c. 52.
6. See, e.g., Miller v. M.N.R., [1962] C.T.C. 199 at p. 212,62 D.T.C. 1139 (Exch. Ct.), in
which Thurlow J. (as he then was) stated of then s. 16(1) that it "is intended to cover
cases where a taxpayer seeks to avoid receipt of what in his hands would be income by
arranging to have the amount received by some other person whom he wishes to benefit
or by some other person for his own benefit"; M.N.R. v. Bronfman, [1965] C.T.C. 378 at
p. 384, 65 D.T.C. 5235 (Exch. Ct.), in which Dumoulin J. emphasized that "the section's
clear enough purpose is the taxation ofindirect payments"; Outerbridge Estate v. Canada,
[1991] 1 C.T.C. 113 at pp. 116-17, 90 D.T.C. 6681 (ECA), in which Marceau J.A.
observed that "the provision ... is rooted in the doctrine of 'constructive receipt' and was
meant to cover principally cases where a taxpayer seeks to avoid receipt of what in his
hands would be income by arranging to have the amount paid to some other person either
for his own benefit (for example, the extinction of a liability) or for the benefit of that
other person", and McClurg v. MN.R., [1991] 1 C.T.C. 169 at pp. 183-84, 91 D.T.C.
5001 (S.C.C.), in which Dickson C.J.C. commented that the provision "is designed to
prevent avoidance by· the taxpayer, through the direction to a third party, of receipts
which he or she otherwise would have obtained". For useful commentaries on s. 56(2) and
its predecessor s. 16(1), see Brian Amold, Tinting and Income Taxation: The Principles of
Income Measurement for Tax Purposes (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1983) at
pp.87-90, emphasizing the provision's origins in the doctrine of "indirect receipt" ac-
cording to which an amount that would be included in a taxpayer's income if directly
received by the taxpayer is taxable to the taxpayer if it is applied by the taxpayer for the
taxpayer's benefit or at the taxpayer's direction, and William I. Innes, "The Taxation of
Indirect Benefits: An Examination of ss. 56(2),56(3), 56(4), 245(2), and 245(3) of the
Income Tax Act" in Report of the Proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth Tax Conference,
1986 Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1987), 42:1-36 at p. 12,
observing that "s. 56(2) adds a novel dimension to the concept of agency or constructive
receipt" by applying "where the taxpayer desired to confer a benefit upon a third party"
and concluding that: "Parliament seems to have concluded, probably correctly, that the
satisfaction of such moral obligations does not fall within the common law principles of
agency or constructive receipt. Accordingly, Parliament perceived the need for a statutory
extension of such principles and embodied it in the predecessor to s. 56(2), first enacted
in 1948."
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In recent years, taxpayers have tested the scope of this anti-
avoidance rule through corporate share capital structures authoriz-
ing the payment of discretionary dividends on classes of shares
typically held by lower-income spouses and children.? In McClurg
v. M.N.R.,8 a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada sanctioned
discretionary dividend clauses as valid under corporate law, but
granted only qualified approval of the use of discretionary dividends
for tax. purposes.9 In Neuman v. M.N.R.,IO however, the court re-
moved any such qualification, opening the door to these share struc-
tures as an effective means of splitting income with spouses or
children. Although the 1999 Federal Budget proposes to preclude
these structures for splitting income with minor children by intro-
ducing a special "income-splitting tax", II discretionary dividends
may still be used to split income with a lower-income spouse.
This comment examines the Supreme Court of Canada decision
in Neuman, considering the grounds of the decision itself as well
as its implications for income splitting, tax avoidance, and the
manner in which the Supreme Court of Canada interprets the
Income Tax Act. Part II reviews the facts of the case, its judicial
history, and the decision reached by the Supreme Court of Canada.
Part ill evaluates this decision in light of the text of s. 56(2), the
purpose of this provision, and the practical consequences of the
court's interpretation. Part IV considers the implications of the
decision and subsequent legislative amendments for income split-
ting, tax avoidance, and statutory interpretation. Part V offers brief
conclusions.
II. NEUMAN
In Neuman, the taxpayer, Melville Neuman, a lawyer practicing
with a Winnipeg fum, established a holding company to which
7. For early cases in which s. 56(2) was held to apply to the payment of discretionary
dividends, see Tzteley v. M.N.R., [1977] C.T.C. 2045, 77 D.T.C. 36 (T.R.B.); Champ v.
The Queen, [1983] C.T.C. 1 (F.C.T.D.); and Cliche v. M.N.R., [1986] 2 C.T.C. 2114, 86
D.T.C. 1571 (T.C.C.). These cases are reviewed in Donald N. Chemiawsky and Marvin
L. Toy, "Income Splitting" in Report ofthe Proceedings ofthe Forty-Eighth Tax Confer-
ence, 1996 Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1997), 52:1-70 at
pp. 18-21.
8. Supra, footnote 6.
9. The decision in McClurg is examined in Parts II and ill of this article.
10. [1998] 3 C.T.C. 177 (S.C.C.).
11. See Hon. Paul Martin, The Budget Plan 1999 (Ottawa: Department ofFinance, Febmary
16, 1999), Annex 7 at pp. 193-94 and 238-39, proposing to apply the top marginal rate
of tax to taxable dividends of private companies (as well as certain other amounts)
received by a minor child.
dividends were paid by the firm's management company and from
which dividends were subsequently paid both to the taxpayer and
to his wife Ruby. The Minister applied s. 56(2) to attribute to the
taxpayer the dividends paid to his wife.
1. Facts-
On April 29, 1981, the taxpayer incorporatedMelru Ventures.
Inc. ("Melru") as a family holding company. According to the
articles of incorporation:
(a) the holders of Class "G" shares shall in each year, in the.discretion of the
directors, be entitled out of any or all profits or surplus av.ailable for dividend
to non-cumulative dividends at such rate as may from time to time be declared
on any such shares but not exceeding the equivalent of I% per annum on'
"redemption price" above the maximum prime bank rates ...
(e) all dividends paid or declared and set aside for payment in any fiscal year,
after making payments on Class "G" shares and preference shares of dividends
declared shall be paid firstly on Class "F" shares until dividends aggregating
l¢ per share on the Class ''F'' shares then outstanding have been paid and then
any additional dividends shall be set aside for payment on common shares
until the common shares then outstanding shall have received 1¢ per share
and any additional dividends shall be paid on Class "F" shares until they
receive that fraction of profits properly available for payment of dividends as
the number of Class ''F'' shares then outstanding bear to the total number of
Class ''F'' shares and common shares then outstanding and the balance shall
in the discretion of the directors be paid on common shares or set aside for
future payment on common shares at the discretion of the board of directors. .
As a result, dividends could be declared at the sole discretion of
the directors, and distributed selectively among the various classes
of shares.
On the same day that he incorporated Melru, the taxpayer trans-
ferred to it on a tax-deferred basis under s. 85(1) of the Income
Tax Act the 1,285.714 shares he held in the fum's management
company, Newmac Services (1973) Ltd. ("Newmac"), the fair
market value of which was reported to be $120,000, receiving in
exchange 1,285.714 voting Class "G" shares of Melru. At a meet-
ing of the first director on May 1, 1981, the taxpayer was appointed
President of Melru, his wife Ruby was appointed Secretary and 1
common voting share of Melru was issued to the taxpayer for $1.
Later that day, 99 non-voting Class ''P' shares of Melru were
issued to Mrs. Neuman at a price of $1 per share.
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At the fIrst annual meeting of Melru shareholders on August
12, 1982, Mrs. Neuman was elected sole director, replacing her
husband. Later that day, a meeting of the board of directors con-
fIrmed Mr Neuman as President of Melru and Mrs. Neuman as
Secretary.
A month later, on September 8, 1982, another meeting of the
Melru board of directors was held. Having received $20,000 in
dividends from Newmac, Mrs. Neuman as sole director of Melru
declared a dividend of $5,000 on the Class "G" shares and $14,800
on the Class ''F'' shares. According to the minutes of the meeting,
the holder of the common shares (i.e., the taxpayer) indicated that
he was prepared to have money set aside for future payment on his
common shares. All decisions of the board were subsequently
confIrmed by a unanimous resolution at a meeting of Melru share-
holders held on October 12, 1983.
Upon receiving the dividends, Mrs. Neuman immediately
loaned the $14,800 to the taxpayer, receiving a demand promissory
note as security. Mrs. Neuman died in 1988 and the loan was never
repaid. By notice dated October 1, 1984, the Minister reassessed
the taxpayer under s. 56(2), including in his income for his 1982
taxation year the $14,800 of dividends received by Mrs. Neuman
from Melru.
2. Judicial History
In the Tax Court of Canada, Sarchuk T.C.C.J. allowed the tax-
payer's appeal, citing Dickson C.J.C.'s majority decision in
McClurg, which held, as a general rule, that s.56(2) does not
apply to the declaration of dividends. 12 In the Federal Court, Trial
Division, Rothstein J. applied this general rule as well, dismissing
the Minister's appeal from the Tax Court decision on the grounds
that s. 56(2) "is not designed to prevent ... income splitting in the
context of the director-shareholder relationship and the declaration
of dividends". 13
The Federal Court of Appeal allowed the Minister's appeal and
upheld the reassessment including in the taxpayer's income for his
1982 taxation year the Melru dividends received by his wife
12. Neuman v. M.N.R., [1992] 2 C.T.C. 2074, 92 D.T.C. 1652 (T.C.c.). The decision in
McClurg is examined later in Part II and in Part m.
13. R. v. Neuman, [1994] I C.T.C. 354, 94 D.T.C. 6094 at p. 6102 (F.C.T.D.).
Ruby. 14 According to Isaac C.J. (Stone and McDonald JJ.A., concur-
ring) the payment satisfIed each of the four elements necessary to
the application of s. 56(2): (1) there was a payment or transfer of
property (the dividends) to a person other than the,taxp~yer .(Mrs.
Neuman);15 (2) the payment or transfer was made at the directIon of
or with the concurrence of the taxpayer;16 (3) the payment was for
the taxpayer's benefIt or as a benefIt that the taxpayer desired to
confer on the recipient,17 and (4) the payme?t ?r trans~er:would have
been included in computing the taxpayer s mcome If It had been
received by him instead of his wife.18
As for Dickson C.J.c.'s decision in McClurg, Isaac C.J. ob- "
served that the general rule according to which s. 56(2) does not
apply to the payment of a dividend was q~alifIedby other.passa~es
in that decision emphasizing the "econoIDlc and commercIal re~lity
of the taxpayer's transactions",19 the recipient's "very real contribu-
tions, financial and operational" to the company,20 and .~e fact th~t
the dividend payments in that case "represented a legItimate quzd
pro quo and were not simply an attempt to avoid the payment of
taxes'',21 In Neuman, on-the other hand:
... the learned Trial Judge found that Melru wa~ incorporated fo.r tax planning
and income splitting purposes and had no other mdependent busmess purpose,
14. Neuman v. M.N.R., [1996] 3 C.T.C. 270, 96 D.T.C. 6464 (ECA).
15. Ibid., at p. 287, citing Champ v. The Queen, supra, footnote 7. . .
16. Ibid., at p. 288, holding "on the balance of probabilities that the diVl~end of $14,8~
was declared to Ruby Neuman with the concurrence of the respondent, and emphasIZ-
ing that "s. 56(2) does not require proof that the transfer of property be both at the
direction of and with the concurrence of the taxpayer". . .
17. Ibid., at p. 288, observing that the taxpayer benefited ~om the payment o~ the diVIdend
in two ways: ''by splitting the dividend from.Newmac I~ the way that he did, he r~uced
the amount of income tax he would otherwIse have pllld and, furthermore. he enjoyed
the use of the full amount of the dividend which his wife had received". To the extent
that the first of these ''benefits'' ignores the separate legal status ofMr and Mrs. ~euman,
while the second ignores the character of the loanback as a sep~te ~saction, the
court's characterization of the payment as a benefit to Mr Neuman IS questionable. Even
if these factors are taken into account, however, it is arguable that the payme~t was a
benefit that Mr Neuman desired to confer on Mrs. Neuman. See the analysIs of the
benefit requirement, infra, text accompanying footnotes 108-114. . ..
18. Ibid., concluding that ''the appellant has also satisfied this element, sJJ~ce, by the conjoint
operation of sections 12(1)CJ)and 82(1) of the Act, the ~videndwhich Ruby Neun:um
received would have been included in the respondent's Income for the 1982 taxation
[year], if it had not been paid to her".
19. McClurg, supra, footnote 6, at p. 183.
20. Ibid., at p. 185.
21. Ibid.
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that the amount of dividends declared were arbitrary and that Ruby Neuman
made no contribution to Melru and did not assume any risks for the company.22
In addition, Isaac C.J. explained, the decision in McClurg had
mentioned a possible distinction in the application of s. -56(2)
between arm's length and non-arm's length trarisactions, sug-
gesting that the provision "may be applicable" to "the exercise of
a discretionary power to distribute dividends When the non-arm's
length shareholder has made no contribution to the company".23 In
light of this statement and the different factual circumstances in
Neuman, the Federal Court ofAppeal held that "s. 56(2) has applica-
tion to the facts of this case and that the Minister was right in
including the dividends which Ruby Neuman received from Melru
in the income of the respondent for the 1982 taxation year".24
3. Supreme Court of Canada Decision
In the Supreme Court of Canada, Iacobucci J., writing for a
unanimous panel of seven judges, allowed the taxpayer's appeal.
Explaining that "the interpretation of this Court's majority decision
in McClurg lies at the heart of the present case",25 Iacobucci 1.
began by stating that "A large part of my analysis will involve a
review of the holdings in McClurg."26 Before examining McClurg,
however, the judgment makes a number of general observations "to
place the present debate into its proper perspective".27
(a) General Observations
First, Iacobucci J. noted, while s. 56(2) "strives to prevent tax
avoidance through income splitting", this provision is "a specific
tax avoidance provision and not a general provision against income
splitting".28 Indeed, he emphasized, since the ITA contains "no
general scheme to prevent income splitting",29 s.56(2) "can only
22. Neuman v. M.N.R., supra, footnote 14, at p. 290.
23. McClurg, supra, footnote 6, at p. 185.
24. Neuman v. M.N.R., supra, footnote 14, at p. 294.
25. Neuman, supra, footnote 10, at p. 186.
26. Ibid., at p. 187.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., citing Vern Krishna and J. Anthony VanDuzer, "Corporate Share Capital Structures
and Income Splitting: McClurg v. Canada" (1992-93), 21 C.B.L.J. 335 at p. 367.
operate to prevent income splitting where the four preconditions to
its application are specifically met".30
Second, Iacobucci J. observed, "this case concerns income re-
ceived by Ruby Neuman during the 1982 taxation year at which
time the ITA did not provide specific guidelines to deal with
corporate structures designed for the purposes of income splitting
and tax minimization".31 Although corporate income splitting is
now subject to a special attribution rule in s. 74.4,32 this provision
was introduced as part of a general revision of the attribution rules
in 1985,33 and did not apply to the transactions in Neuman which
occurred in 1981 and 1982.
Third, he added, "this appeal is limited to the interpretation and
application of s. 56(2) of the ITA; the appeal is not based on the
general anti-avoidance rule set out in s. 245 of the ITA ("GAAR")".34
The GAAR, as Iacobucci 1. noted, came into force on September 13,
1988 and applies only to transactions entered into on or after that
date.35 .
Fourth, he explained, "the respondent has not argued that the
appellant was involved in a sham or an artificial transaction".36
Although the fact that Mrs. Neuman loaned the amount of the
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. This provision deems individuals who transfer or loan property to a corporation ~ther
than a "small business corporation" to have received interest computed at a prescnbed
rate on the outstanding amount of the loan or transferred property, where "one of the
main purposes of the transfer or loan may reasonably be considered to be to reduce the
income of the individual and to benefit" a spouse or related minor owning not less than
10% of the issued shares of any class of the capital stock of the corporation. Given the
finding of the trial judge that Melru was incorporated for tax planning and income-
splitting purposes and had no other independent business purpose, and the fact that Mrs.
Neuman held all of the Class "F' shares, it follows that s. 74.4 could have applied to the
transactions in Neuman had the provision existed in 1981 and 1982.
33. S.C. 1986, c. 6, s. 38, applicable with respect to loans and transfers of property made
after November 21, 1985. For a thorough review of the revised attribution rules, see
Claire F.L. Young, "The Attribution Rules: Their Uncertain Future in Light of Current
Problems" (1987), 35 Can. Tax J. 275.
34. Ibid.
35. S.C. 1988, c. 55, s. 185, applicable with respect to transactions entered into on or after
September 13, 1988. For an excellent explanation of the general anti-avoidance rule,
see Brian J. Arnold and James R. Wilson, ''The General Anti-Avoidance Rule - Parts I,
II and ill" (1988), 36 Can. Tax J. 829, 1123 and 1369. For a more recent review,
see John R. Owen, "Statutory Interpretation and the General Anti-Avoidance Rule: A
Practitioner's Perspective (1998), 46 Can. Tax J. 233.
36. Ibid.
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dividends back to Mr Neuman interest-free immediately after re-
ceiving the dividends might have suggested the possibility of a
"sham" in which "acts done or documents executed ... are intended
... to give to third parties ... the appearance of creating ... legal
rights and obligations different from the actual legal rights and
obligations (if any) which the parties intend to create'?7 the Minister
apparently concluded that the legal rights and obligations actually
created by Mr and Mrs. Neuman were consistent with their docu-
mentation, namely the payment of a dividend to Mrs. Neuman and
the transfer of these funds to Mr Neuman by way of an interest-free
demand loan secured by a promissory note. As for the question of
"artificiality", which relates to the anti-avoidance rule in former
s. 245(1),38 it is unlikely that it could have applied to the transactions
in Neuman, since they did not result in any "deduction ... in respect
of a disbursement or expense made or incurred" even if they might
have reduced the taxpayer's income "unduly or artificially".39
Finally, Iacobucci J. emphasized, "it is important to remember
that this Court held unanimously in Stubart ... that a transaction
should not be disregarded for tax purposes because it has no
37. See Snook v. London & West Riding Investments Ltd, [1967] 1 All E.R. 518 at p. 528
(C.A.) per Lord Diplock, cited with approval in M.N.R. v. Cameron, [1972] C.T.C. 380,
72 D.T.C. 6325 (S.C.C.). See also Stubart Investments Ltd. v. The Queen, [1984] C.T.C.
294 at p. 313, 84 D.T.C. 6305 (S.C.C.), where Estey J. characterized a "sham" as a
situation in which: "The transaction and the form in which it was cast by the parties and
their legal and accounting advisers [can] be said to have been so constructed as to create
a false impression in the eyes of a third party, specifically the taxing authority". The
Supreme Court of Canada has reaffirmed this definition on several occasions: McClurg,
supra, footnote 6, atp. 183; Antosko-v. The Queen, [1994] 2 C.T.C. 25, 94D.T.C. 6314
(S.C.C.) at p.30; and Continental Bank Leasing v. Canada, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 298.
According to the sham doctrine, the tax consequences of a transaction are to be deter-
mined according to the legal rights and obligations actually created by the parties to the
transaction, not apparent rights and obligations reflected in acts or documents intended
to create a different impression in the eyes of third parties. For applications of the sham
doctrine in Canadian tax law, see M.N.R. v. Shields, [1962] C.T.C. 548, 62 D.T.C. 1343
(Exch. Ct.); Susan Hosiery v. M.N.R., [1969] C.T.C. 533, 69 D.T.C. 5346 (Exch. Ct.);
and Dominion Bridge Company Ltd. v. The Queen, [1975] C.T.C. 263,75 D.T.C. 5150
(EC.T.D.), affd [1977] C.T.C. 554,77 D.T.C. 5367 (EC.A.).
38. According to this provision, the Minister could disallow any "deduction ... in respect
of a disbursement or expense made or incurred in respect of a transaction or operation
that, if allowed, would unduly or artificially reduce [a taxpayer's] income".
39. For applications of this provision and its predecessors, see Shulma~ v. M.N.R., [1961]
C.T.C. 385, 61 D.T.C. 1213 (Exch. Ct.); Don Fell Ltd. v. The Queen, [1981] C.T.C. 363,
81 D.T.C. 5282 (F.C.T.D.); Fording Coal v. The Queen, [1996] 1 C.T.C. 230,95 D.T.C.
5672 (F.C.A.), and Central Supply Co. (1972) Ltd. v. The Queen, [1997] 3 C.T.C. 102
(ECA).
independent or bona fide business purpose".40 On the contrary, he
affirmed, "taxpayers can arrange their affairs in a particular way for
the sole purpose of deliberately availing themselves of tax reduction
devices in the ITA".4' Moreover, he added, in applying this prinCiple,
Estey J. 's decision in Stubart "rejected the suggestion that a distinc-
tion must be drawn between non-arm's length and arm's length
transactions".42 As a result, he concluded, "non-arm's length ar-
rangements can also be created for the sole purpose of taking advan-
tage of tax reduction devices" .43
(b) Analysis of McClurg
Having made these general observations, the rest of Iacobucci
J.'s decision is devoted almost entirely. to a detailed analysis of
Dickson C.J.C.'s majority judgment in McClurg. Given the judicial
history of the case, in which the two lower courts relied on Dic~0!1
c.J.C.'s suggestion that s. 56(2) generally does not apply to dIVI-
dends while the Federal Court of Appeal emphasized other state-
ments qualifying this general rule, Iacobucci J. understandably
considered his primary task to be the clarification of these appar-
ently contradictory views. Reaffirming the general rule that
s. 56(2) does not apply to dividends, and rejecting any qualification
or exception to this rule, the court allowed the taxpayer's appeal.
(i) The General Rule
With respect to the general rule that s. 56(2) does not apply to
dividends, Iacobucci J.'s decision restated the two arguments for
this conclusion that Dickson C,J.C. had set out in McClurg. First,
Iacobucci J. explained, since the purpose of s. 56(2) is "to capture
and attribute to the reassessed taxpayer 'receipts which he or she
otherwise would have obtained' ",44 the provision "does not apply
to dividend income since, until a dividend is declared, the profits
belong to the corporation as retained earnings".45 As Dickson C.J.C.
had stated in McClurg:
40. Neuman, supra, footnote 10, at p. 188. The reference to Stubart is to the Supreme Court
of Canada decision in Stubart Investments Ltd. v. The Queen, supra. footnote 37.
41. Neuman. ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., at p. 190, citing McClurg, supra, footnote 6, at pp. 183-84.
45. Neuman. ibid.
In order to avoid these consequences, therefore, s. 56(2) must be
interpreted to exclude the payment of dividends.
46. McClurg, supra, footnote 6, atp. 184.
47. Neuman, supra, footnote 10, at p. 190.
48. Ibid., at p. 191.
49. Ibid., atp. 190.
50. McClurg, supra, footnote 6, at p. 184.
The purpose of subsection 56(2) is to ensure that payments which otherwise
would have been received by the taxpayer are not diverted to a third party as
an anti~avoidance [sic] technique. This purpose is not frustrated because, in
the corporate law context, until a dividend is declared, the profits belong to a
corporation as a juridical person ... Had a dividend not been declared and
paid to a third party, it would not otherwise have been received by the
taxpayer. Rather, the amount simply would have been retained as earnings by
the company. Consequently, as a general rule, a dividend payment cannot
reasonably be considered a benefit diverted from a taxpayer to a third party
within the contemplation of subsection 56(2).46
According to Iacobucci J., these comments, though not explicit,
concern the fourth element necessary to the'application of s. 56(2):
that the payment or transfer of property would have been included
in the taxpayer's income if it had been made to the taxpayer rather
than the third party. In effect, he explained, "this Court implicitly
interpreted the fourth precondition to include an entitlement re-
quirement: entitlement is used in the sense that the reassessed
taxpayer would have otherwise received the payments in dis-
pute".47 Thus, he concludes: .
... unless a reassessed taxpayer had a preexisting entitlement to the dividend
income paid to the shareholder of a corporation, the fourth precondition
cannot be satisfied and consequently s. 56(2) cannot operate to attribute the
dividend income to that taxpayer for income tax purposes.48
Second, Iacobucci J. added, an interpretation of s. 56(2) that
excludes dividend income "is the only interpretation which makes
sense and which avoids absurdity in the application of s. 56(2)" .49
As Dickson C,J.C. emphasized in McClurg:
If this Court were to find otherwise, corporate directors potentially could be
found liable for the tax consequences of any declaration of dividends made to
a third party ... [T]his would be an unrealistic interpretation of the subsection
consistent with neither its object nor its spirit. It would violate fundamental
principles of corporate law and the realities of commercialpractice and would
"overshoot" the legislative purpose of the section.50
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51. Ibid., at p. 185.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55 On the uncertainty resulting from the decision in McClurg, see Krishna and VanDuzer,
. supra, footnote 29, at p. 361, commenting that the cOl;lrt's emphasis on the "legitimate
contribution" of the dividend recipient "muddles the Issue for future cases and leaves
the law in a state of uncertainty".
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(ii) Qualifications
Notwithstanding these arguments for a general rule excluding
dividend income from the scope of s.56(2), Dickson C,J.C.'s
judgment in McClurg also made a number of comments apparently
qualifying this rule. First, he added: "Although I have concluded
that s. 56(2) does not apply to the declaration of dividends gen~r­
ally, its application also would be contrary to the co~erclal
reality of this particular transaction."51 Noting that the ~eclplet,'lt of
discretionary dividends in McClurg (the taxpayer's wife, WIlma
McClurg) had made "very real contributions, financial and opera-
tional" to the company paying the dividends,52 Dickson C,J.C. em-
phasized that the dividend payment at. issue in the case was "the
product of a bona fide business relationship" representing "a legiti-
mate quidpro quo" and "not simply an attempt to avoid the payment
of taxes".53 More importantly, he suggested:
In my opinion if a distinction is to be drawn in the application of subsection
56(2) betwee~ arms length and non arms length transac?o~s, it s~o~d be
made between the exercise of a discretionary power to distnbute dIVIdends
when the non arms length shareholder h~s made no co?tribution to the
company (in which case subsection 56(1) [SIC] may be applicable), and those
cases in which a legitimate contribution has been ma~e. ~ the case .of the
latter, of which this appeal is an example, I do not think It can be Said that
there was no legitimate purpose to the dividend distribution.54
As the judicial history in Neuman suggests, these comments,
following immediately after the declaration of a general rule ex-
cluding dividend payments from the scope of s. 56(2), creat~d
considerable uncertainty.55 Were these ~omments part of ~e rc:tto
decidendi, or merely obiter dicta? More Importantly, even If oblter,
what, if any, weight should they be given in a ~ase suc~ ~s Neuman,
where a non-arm's length recipient of discretionary diVIdends had
made no contribution to the company paying the dividends?
In the Federal Court of Appeal, Isaac C,J. emphasized that :'the
applicability of section 56(2) to non-arm's length transactIOns
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was a live one in McClurg", but concluded that Dickson C.J.C.'s
comments on this point "could not be considered part of the ratio
decidendi" in light of the court's finding that the dividend recipient
h~~ made5: legitimate contribution to the company paying the
d~VIde~?s. Nonetheless, he he~d: "Although not necessary for the
dispOSItion of that appeal, the opmion expressed by the Chief Justice
represented the considered opinion of a majority of the Court and
was therefore binding on the Courts below and on this COurt."57
Paying heed to Dickson C.J.C.'s opinion, therefore, and noting that
Mrs. Neuman had "made no contribution to the company and as-
sumed none of the risks for it", the Federal Court of Appeal held
that s. 56(2) applied to attribute to the taxpayer the dividends that
Mrs. Neuman received in 1982.
In the Supreme Court of Canada, Iacobucci J. reconsidered
Dickson ~.J.C.'s qualifying comments, rejecting any qualification
or exceptIOn to the general rule expressed in McClurg that s. 56(2)
does not apply to the payment of dividends. First, he explained,
t~~se ~omments w~re ~oncemed primarily with the "third precon-
dition to the application of s. 56(2): "that the payment must be
for the benefit of the reassessed taxpayer or for the benefit of
another person whom the reassessed taxpayer wished to benefit".58
According to Iacobucci 1.:
In [Dickson C.J.C.'s] view, Wllma McClurg's receipt of the funds was not a
".benefit" as required by s. 56(2) (the third precondition) since her contribu-
tions to the corporate enterprise could be described as a "legitimate quid pro
quo and were not simply an attempt to avoid the payment of taxes" ... Since
Wi~ ~cClurg had n;;ade legitimate contributions to the corporation, the
application of s. 56(2) would be contrary to the commercial reality of this
particular transaction".59
More significantly, Iacobucci J. continued, in his comments on
the possible application of s. 56(2) to dividend payments to a non-
arm's length shareholder who has made no contribution to the
co~pany Dic~on C.J.c. appears to disregard the entitlement re-
qU1!ement prevIously read into the fourth precondition to the appli-
catIOn of s. 56(2). According to Iacobucci J.:
Dickson C.J. is .sugges~~, it would seem, that where a non-arm's length
shareholder receives a dividend from a corporation to which he or she has
56. Neuman v. M.N.R., supra, footnote 14, at p. 294.
57. Ibid.
58. Nelunan, supra, footnote to, at p. 192.
59. Ibid.
made no contribution (the dividend income therefore constituting a "benefit"
for the purposes of s. 56(2) in Dic~on C.J.'s view), precondition four, inter-
preted by him to include an entitlement requirement, is automatically consid-
ered satisfied, or need not be satisfied, with the result that s. 56(2) applies.60
In other words, Iacobucci J. concludes, by qualifying the general
rule that s. 56(2) does not apply to dividends in the context of
dividend payments to a non-arm's length shareholders making no
contribution to the company paying the dividends, Dickson C.J.C.
created an exception not only to the general rule but to the more
basic requirement read into the fourth precondition that the reas-
sessed taxpayer would otherwise have been entitled to the payment
or transfer of property.
Having thus interpreted Dickson C.J.C.'s qualifying comments
as "an exception to the general rule that s. 56(2) does not apply to
dividend income",61 Iacobucci 1. presented several reasons why
such an exception is unwarranted. First, he argued, Dickson C.J.C.'s
approach "ignores the fundamental nature of dividends" which are
"related by way of entitlement to one's capital or share interest in
the corporation and not to any other consideration".62 Assuming that
"proper consideration was given for the shares when issued", he
explained, there is no "principle of corporate law" that "requires in
addition that a so-called 'legitimate contribution' be made by a
shareholder to entitle him or her to dividend income".63 As a result,
since "it is well accepted that tax law embraces corporate law
principles unless such principles are specifically set aside by a taxing
statute", Iacobucci 1. sees no justification for an exception to the
rule that s. 56(2) does not apply to dividend income where a non-
arm's length shareholder has not made a "legitimate contribution"
to the company.64
60. Ibid., at p. 193.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid., at 192, adding that ''the quantum of one's contribution to a company, and any
dividends received from that corporation, are mutually independent ofone another" and
citing La Forest J.'s dissenting reasons in McClurg, supra, footnote 6, where he stated
at p. 195 that:
To relate dividend receipts to the amount of effort expended by the recipient on
behalf of the payor corporation is to misconstrue the nature of a dividend. As
discussed earlier, a dividend is received by virtue of ownership of the capital stock
of the corporation. It is a fundamental principle of corporate law that a dividend is a
return on capital which attaches to a share, and is in no way dependent on the
conduct of a particular shareholder.
63. Neuman, ibid., at p. 193.
64. Ibid.
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Second, Iacobucci J. continued, "there is no principled basis"
upon which it is possible to draw Dickson C.J.C.'s proposed dis-
tinction between the payment of dividends generally and the pay-
ment of dividends to a non-arm's length shareholder who has made
no contribution to the corporation. On the contrary, he argued:
[T]he fact that a company is closely held or that no contribution is made to
the company by a shareholder benefiting from a dividend in no way changes
the underlying nature of a dividend. Neither the fact that the transaction is
non-arm's length nor the fact that the shareholder has not contributed to the
corporation serves to overcome the conclusion that dividend income cannot
satisfy the fourth precondition to attribution under s. 56(2).65
Third, he adds, any rule based on a non-arm's length sharehold-
er's "legitimate contribution" to the company paying the dividends
creates a "difficult task of determining what constitutes a legiti-
mate contribution".66 Questioning "the criteria upon which one can
ascertain with any degree of precision or certainty that a contribution
is legitimate",67 Iacobucci J. suggested, without stating so explicitly,
that Dickson C.J.C.'s proposed qualification to the general rule
excluding dividend income from the scope of s. 56(2) is unworkable.
Finally, Iacobucci J. concluded, to recognize an exception to the
general rule that s. 56(2) does not apply to dividend income where
a non-arm's length recipient has not made a legitimate contribution
to the corporation would contradict fundamental principles of Ca-
nadian income tax law, according to which "taxpayers are entitled
to arrange their affairs for the sole purpose of achieving a favour-
able position regarding taxation and no distinction is to be made
in the application of this principle between arm's length and non-
arm's length transactions".68 According to Iacobucci J.:
Implicit in the distinction between non-arm's length and arm's length transac-
tions is the assumption that non-arm's length transactions lend themselves to
the creation of corporate structures which exist for the sole purpose of
avoiding tax and therefore should be caught by s. 56(2) ... The ITA has many
specific anti-avoidance provisions and rules governing the treatment of non-
arm's length transactions. We should not be quick to embellish the provision
at issue here when it is open for the legislator to be precise and specific with
respect to any mischief to be avoided.69
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid., at p. 194.
69. Ibid.
In the absence of any general distinction between arm's length and
non-arm's length transactions or any specific reference to non-
arm's length transactions in s. 56(2), therefore, such a distinction
should not be read into the provision.
(iii) Conclusion
Reaffirming the general rule in McClurg that s. 56(2) does not
apply to dividend income and rejecting any qualification or excep-
tion to this rule, the Supreme Court of Canada necessarily con-
cluded that s. 56(2) could not apply to the dividends that Mrs.
Neuman received from Melru. According to Iacobucci J.: "I con-
clude that s. 56(2) does not apply to dividend income such that the
dividend income received by Ruby Neuman cannot be attributed
to the appellant for income taxpurposes."70 The appeal wasal-
lowed, the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal was reversed,
and that portion of the reassessment attributing toMr Neuman the
dividends received from Melro by Mrs. Neuman was set aside.
III. EVALUATION
While the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Neuman effec-
tively restates Dickson C.J.c. 's argument in McClurg for a general
rule excluding dividend payments from the scope of s. 56(2), it
does little to explain Dickson C.J.C.'s qualifying comments, dis-
missing his statement on the possible application of s. 56(2) to
dividend payments to a non-arm's length shareholder who has
made no contribution to the company paying the dividends as an
unwarranted and largely inexplicable exception to the general rule.
This section of the article argues that as a result, the decision
disregards the text of s. 56(2), misinterprets Dickson C.J.C.'s judg-
ment in McClurg, contradicts prior cases in which s. 56(2) and its
predecessor have been applied to payments or transfers ofproperty
by a corporation to a third party whom a director-shareholder
desired to benefit notwithstanding that the director-shareholder
was not immediately entitled to the payment or transfer of the
property, and produces consequences at odds with the scheme of
the Act and basic principles of tax fairness.
This section re-examines the Supreme Court of Canada decision
in Neuman in light of the text of s. 56(2), the purpose of this
70. Ibid., at p. 179.
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provision, and the practical consequences of alternative interpreta-
tions.71 While this analysis supports a general rule, such as that
affirmed in McClurg, according to which "the declaration of a
dividend is normally beyond the scope of s. 56(2)",72 it does not
support an absolute rule, such as that adopted in Neuman, according
to which s.56(2) cannot apply to any dividends except those to
which a reassessed taxpayer had a preexisting entitlement.73 On the
contrary, it concludes that where the payment of a discretionary
dividend benefits the reassessed taxpayer or some other person upon
whom the taxpayer desired to confer a benefit, as it did in Neuman,
the dividend should be subject to the attribution rule in s. 56(2).
1. Textual Analysis
Among the most significant considerations in statutory interpre-
tation is the text of the relevant statute, both the provision at issue
and the statute as a whole. Although the words of an Act are, as the
Supreme Court of Canada has emphasized on several occasions,
properly read "in their entire context and their grammatical and
ordinary sense, harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the
object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament",74 attention to the
words of the statutory text is a basic tenet of statutory interpretation,
constraining judicial discretion and reflecting widely held values
associated with legislative supremacy and the rule of law.75 In the
interpretation of the Income Tax Act, both the "plain meaning rule"
and the "words-in-total-context approach" place primary emphasis
on the words of the statutory text, though they differ in the manner
71. Consideration of these various factors is consistent with the explicitly pragmatic ap-
proach to statutory interpretation that I advocate elsewhere. See David G. Duff, ''Inter-
preting the Income TaxAct - Part IT: Towards a Pragmatic Approach" (1999), 47 Can.
Tax J. (forthcoming). To the extent that the Supreme Court of Canada considers textual,
purposive, and consequential considerations to interpret provisions of the Income Tax
Act, I argue among other things that the court's actual practice of statutory interpretation
is implicitly pragmatic notwithstanding the specific interpretive doctrine (e.g., teleologi-
cal approach or plain meaning rule) to which the court actually refers.
72. McClurg, supra, footnote 6, at p. 185 (emphasis added).
73. Neuman, supra, footnote to, at p. 191.
74. See, e.g., Stubart, supra, footnote 37, at p. 316, citing E.A. Driedger, Construction of
Statutes, 2nd ed. (Toronto, Butterworths, 1983), p. 87.
75. See, e.g., William Eskridge, Jr. and Philip Frickey, "Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning" (1990),42 Stan. L. Rev. 321 at p. 354, explaining that: "All that is enacted
into law is the statutory text, and at the very least legislative supremacy means that an
interpreter must be attentive to the text. Functionally, citizens and lawmakers will rely
on the apparent meaning of statutory texts. Textual primacy can also be a useful concrete
limit on judicial power."
in which these words are construed.76 In interpreting s. 56(2), there-
fore, a reasonable starting point is the words of the provision itself.
As the Supreme Court of Canada affirms in Neuman, the text of
s. 56(2) specifies four elements or "preconditions" to the applica-
tion of the rule: .
(1) the payment must be to a person other than the reassessed taxpayer;
(2) the allocation must-be at the direction of or with the concurrence of the
reassessed taxpayer;
(3) the payment must be for the benefit of the reassessed taxpayer or for the
benefit of another person whom the reassessed taxpayer wished to benefit;
and
(4) the payment would have been included in the reassessed taxpayer's income
if it had been received by him or her.n
In the Federal Court of Appeal, Isaac C.J. concluded that the
dividend payment to Mrs. Neuman satisfied each of these ele-
ments: a payment of property was made to Mrs. Neuman; the
payment was made with the concurrence of Mr Neuman; the
payment was for the benefit of Mr Neuman; and the payment
would have been included in Mr Neuman's income if it had been
made to him rather than Mrs. Neuman.78 Although it might have
been more persuasive to characterize the payment not as a benefit to
Mr Neuman but as a benefit that MrNeuman desired to confer on
Mrs. Neuman,79 this textual analysis suggests that the dividend in-
come should have been caught by s. 56(2).
On appeal, however, the Supreme Court of Canada relied on
Dickson C.J;C.'s decision in McClurg to hold that "dividend in-
come, by its very nature, cannot satisfy the fourth precondition".80
According to Iacobucci 1.: "Dividend income cannot pass the fourth
test because the dividend, if paid to a shareholder, remains with the
corporation as retained earnings; the reassessed taxpayer, as either
director or shareholder of the corporation, has no entitlement to the
76. These doctrinal approaches, and leading tax cases in which they have been applied, are
reviewed in David G. Duff, "Interpreting the Income Tax Act - Part I: Interpretive
Doctrines" (1999), 47 Can. Tax J. 464.
77. Supra, footnote to, at p. 186, citing MUlphy v. The Queen, [1980] C.T.C. 386, 80 D.T.C.
6314 at pp. 6317-318 (EC.T.D.); and Fraser Companies v. The Queen, [1981] C.T.C.
61,81 D.T.C. 5051 at p. 5058 (EC.T.D.).
78. See supra, footnotes 14-18 and accompanying text.
79. See supra, footnote 17.
80. Neuman, supra, footnote to, at p. 186.
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money."81 On this basis, the court concluded, the dividend payment
to Mrs. Neuman was not subject to the attribution rule in s. 56(2).
Based on a textual analysis, however, an obvious problem with
the court's interpretation is its apparent inconsistency with the
words of the statutory provision. While the text of s. 56(2) requires
a payment or transfer ofproperty satisfying the fust three precondi-
tions to be "included in computing the taxpayer's income to the
extent that it would be if the payment or transfer had been made
to the taxpayer", the court reads the fourth precondition in s. 56(2)
as if it applied only if "the reassessed taxpayer would have other-
wise received the payments in dispute".82 Absent a compelling
argument that this interpretation is mandated by the scheme of
the Act, the object of the Act, the intention of Parliament, or the
consequences of a more straightforward reading of the text, such a
marked departure from the words of the text raises significant con-
cerns about judicial discretion and fidelity to principles of legislative
supremacy. --
In Neuman, of course, Iacobucci J. relied on Dickson c.J.C.'s
analysis, in McClurg to conclude that a general rule excluding
dividend income from the scope of s. 56(2) was not only "consis-
tent with the stated purpose of s. 56(2) ... to capture and attribute
to the reassessed taxpayer 'receipts which he or she would other-
wise have obtained"',83 but also "the only interpretation which
makes sense and which avoids absurdity in the application of
s. 56(2)".84 The extent to which it is necessary to depart from the
words of the statutory text, therefore, depends on the strength of the
court's purposive and consequential analysis.
2. Purposive Analysis
In addition to the words of the relevant statute and provision,
courts frequently consider the object or purpose of the text in order
to assist in its interpretation. By reading statutory provisions not
literally but in light of "the scheme of the Act, the object of the
Act, and the intention of Parliament",85 courts co-operate in the
fulfilment of legislative aims and intentions in a manner consistent
81. Ibid., at p. 190.
82. Ibid. (emphasis added).
83. Ibid., citing McClurg, supra, footnote 6, at p. 184.
84. Ibid.
85. Driedger, supra, footnote 74, at p. 87.
with the democratic values associated with the principle of legisla-
tive supremacy.86 In at least one recent tax case, moreover, the
Supreme Court of Canada suggested that in the interpretation of any
statute, including tax statutes, courts should "fust ... determine the
purpose of the legislation, whether as a whole or as expressed in a
particular provision"87 and apply a strict or liberal approach to the
provision at issue "depending on the purpose underlying it".88
Consistent with this purposive or teleological approach, Dickson
c.J.C.'s analysis of s. 56(2) in McClurg began by considering not
the text of the provision but its purpose. At the outset, therefore,
he referred to a prior decision in which the Exchequer Court stated
that:
... s. 16(1) [the predecessor to current s. 56(2)] is intended to cover cases
where a taxpayer seeks to avoid receipt of what in his hands would be income
by arranging to have the amount received by some other person whom he
wishes to benefit or by some other person for his own benefit. The scope of
the subsection is not obscure for one does not speak of benefitting a person in
the sense of the subsection by making a business contract with him for
adequate consideration.89
Similarly, Dickson C.J.c. concluded, s. 56(2) "is designed to pre-
vent avoidance by the taxpayer, through the direction to a third.
party, of receipts which he or she otherwise would have ob-
tained".90 In addition, he explained, "the subsection reasonably can-
not have been intended to cover benefits conferred for adequate
consideration in the context of a legitimate business relationship".91
While the first of these propositions involves the fourth precondition
to the application of s. 56(2) that the payment or transfer of property
86. See, e.g., J.A. Corry, "Administrative Law and the Interpretation of Statutes" (1936), 1
U.T.L.J. 286 at p. 289, emphasizing the importance of "intelligent judicial co-operation"
in a parliamentary democracy in "the fulfilment of the aims and objects of parliament".
See also Eskridge and Frickey, supra, footnote 75, at p. 356, observing that: "Original
legislative expectations are important in a democracy where the legislature is the
primary source of lawmaking ... To the extent that the Court can recover that original
meaning, it subserves democratic values by enforcing the law as the legislature under-
stood it, thus limiting judicial discretion and power."
87. Corporation Notre-Dame de Bon-Secours v. Quebec, [1995] 1 C.T.C. 241 at p. 250, 95
D.T.C. 5017 (S.C.C.).
88. Ibid., at p. 252. For a more detailed explanation of this purposive or teleological
approach, reviewing leading tax cases in which it has been defined and applied, see
Duff, "Interpreting the Income TaxAct - Part I: Interpretive Doctrines", supra, footnote
76, at pp. 485-504.
89. Millen. M.N.R., supra, footnote 6, at p. 212.
90. McClurg, supra, footnote 6, at pp. 183-84.
91. Ibid., at p. 184.
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would have been included in the reassessed taxpayer's income if it
had been made to him or her, the second proposition concerns the
third precondition that the payment or transfer of property must
benefit the reassessed taxpayer or some other person upon whom
the reassessed taxpayer desired to confer a benefit.
In light of this purposive analysis, Dickson C.J.C. adopted a
strict approach to the interpretation of s. 56(2), concluding as an
initial matter that the provision does not applyto dividend income
since dividends, if not declared and paid, ''would not otherwise
have been received by the taxpayer" but "would simply have been
retained as earnings by the company" to which" corporate profits
otherwise ''belong ... as a juridical person".92 On the other hand,
he suggested, s. 56(2) might apply to "the exercise ofa discretionary
power to distribute dividends" where dividends are paid to a "non-
arm's length shareholder [who] has made no contribution to the
company" paying the dividends.93 As a result, he concluded, "the
declaration of a dividend is normally beyond the scope of s. 56(2)
of the Income Tax Act".94
In Neuman, however, Iacobucci J. rejected any qualification to
the general rule excluding dividend income from the scope of
s. 56(2), reaffirming Dickson C.J.C.'s initial conclusion that be-
cause the purpose of s. 56(2) is "to capture and attribute to the
reassessed taxpayer 'receipts which he or she otherwise would
have obtained' ",95 the provision "does not apply to dividend income
since, until a dividend is declared, the profits belong to the corpora-
tion as retained earnings".96
(a) Entitlement Requirement
Accepting the court's characterization of the purpose of s. 56(2)
to attribute to the reassessed taxpayer payments or transfers of
property that he or she "otherwise would have obtained",97 there
are at least two problems with the conclusion in Neuman that this
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid., at p. 185.
94. Ibid. (emphasis added).
95. Neuman, supra, footnote 10, at p. 190, citing McClurg, supra, footnote 6, at pp. 183-84.
96. Ibid.
97. McClurg, supra, footnote 6, at pp. 183-84 (C.T.C.). Although the legislative record
contains no commentaI)' on the purpose of then s. 16(1) when it was introduced in 1948,
this purpose is widely accepted by courts and commentators and broadly consistent with
the words of the statutoI)' text. See the cases and commentaries cited supra, footnote 6.
p.urpos~ eXclu~es all dividend income from the scope of the provi-
SIOn. FIrst, while the court's purposive analysis justifies the inClusion
of an entitlement requirement to the fourth precondition that the
payment or transfer of property would have been included in the
reassessed taxpayer's income if it had been made to him or her it
does not necessitate that this entitlement be direct or immediate' as
opposed to indirect or prospective. Indeed, although it is true that a
dividend payment, if not made to one class of shareholders, remains
the property of the corporation as a separate juridical person, it is
also true that the non-payment of dividends on one class of shares
increases either the cash available for the payment of dividends on
other share classes or the value of these other shares if retained by
the company. In either event, as I have argued elsewhere:
. : . to ~e extent that other shareholders have a prospective though not imme-
dIate nght to the profits from which a dividend is paid, it is arguable that but
for the payment of a dividend on one class of shares, shareholders of other
classes would have obtained these profits in one form or another.98
For this reason, it follows that the application of s. 56(2) to divi-
dend payme~ts is entirely consistent with its accepted purpose "to
pr~vent aVOIdance by the taxpayer, through the direction to a
third party, of receipts which he or she otherwise would have
obtained".99 Indeed, to hold otherwise is, to use Dickson C.J.e. 's
expressions, both "formalistic in the extreme" and "contrary to
commercial reality".100
Second, while a rule excluding all dividend income from the
~copeof s. 56(2) depends on an immediate entitlement requirement
In the sense that the reassessed taxpayer would have otherwise
received the payments in dispute directly, this requirement was
explicitly rejected in at least two decisions in which the provision
was held to apply to shareholders of closely held companies who
directed or concurred in the payment or transfer of property to
third parties, notwithstanding that these shareholders were not
immediately entitled to the property themselves. In M.N.R. v.
B.ronjman,101 for example, then s. 16(1) was applied to attribute to a
dIrector-shareholder of a closely held corporation a pro rata share
98. Duff, "Interpreting the Income TaxAct - Part I: Interpretive Doctrines", supra, footnote
76, at p. 499.
99. McClurg, supra, footnote 6, at pp. 183-84.
100. Ibid., at pp. 184 and 185 (C.T.C.).
·101. Supra, footnote 6.
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of the value of certain gifts made by the corporation to various
family members, former employees, and their dependents. Rejecting
the taxpayer's argument that the application of then s. 16(1) required
"personal ownership of the moneys ... paid out" in the form of
gifts, Dumoulin J. replied:
I would think not, because ... the section's clear enough purpose is the
taxation of indirect payments under circumstances such as the instant ones. If
so, then, a norm or basis of assessment must be set, and this ~as done by
Parliament assimilating the payer's funds, corporate body or third party of
any other description, to the personal income of the taxpayer directing these
payments or merely concurring in their performance, to the extent that they
would have increased his income had they been made to him.102
By attributing to the taxpayer a pro rata share of the value of
the gifts based on his percentage shareholding in the company,
however, the court assumed a requirement of indirect or prospec-
tive entitlement.
Similarly, in Outerbridge Estate v. Canada,103 the Federal Court
of Appeal applied s. 56(2) to attribute to the controlling sh~eholder
of an investment holding company a pro rata share of the dIfference
between the fair market value of shares sold by the company to the
taxpayer's son-in-law ($1,089 per share) and the amount paid by the
purchaser ($100 per share). Rejecting the view that s. 56(2) requ~es
the taxpayer to have been immediately entitled to the property w~ch
is paid or transferred to the third party, Marceau J.A. (MacGmgan
and Decary B.A., concurring) concluded that:
The fact that [the taxpayer] had no direct right to the shares would have a
bearing if the provision was to be construed as covering only cases of diver-
sion of income receivable by the taxpayer and there is no indication whatever
that the provision was meant to be so confmed.
[T]he language of the provision does not require, for its application, that the
taxpayer be initially entitled to the payment or transfer of property made to
the third party, only that he would have been subject to tax had the payment
or transfer been made to him.104
Although the attribution of an amount based on the taxpayer's
percentage shareholding in the investment holding company re-
flects a notion of prospective entitlement, consistent with the stated
102. Ibid., at p. 384.
103. Supra, footnote 6.
104. Ibid., at pp. 116-17.
purpose of s. 56(2) to attribute amounts diverted to third parties
which the taxpayer "would otherwise have obtained",105 the court
did not insist on an immediate entitlement requirement.
While Dickson c.J.c. considered neither of these decisions in
McClurg, Iacobucci J. acknowledged in Neuman that "the decision
in Outerbridge Estate . .. appears to challenge the view that where
a taxpayer is not entitled to a payment that the payment cannot be
attributed to him or her under s. 56(2)".106 Nonetheless, he con-
cluded, because "Outerbridge Estate concerned the conferral of a
benefit which was not in the form of dividend incQme",107 it does
not affect the general rule in McClurg that s. 56(2) does not apply to
dividend income. Since the formulation of a general rule excluding
dividends from the scope of s. 56(2) depends on the inclusion of
an immediate entitlement requirement in the fourth precondition,
however, this assumed distinction cannot be sustained. Indeed, since
s. 56(2) refers to a "payment or transfer of property", it is unclear
on what principled basis any distinction between dividend income
and other payments or transfers of property might rest.
(b) Benefit Requirement
Although the court's purposive analysis in McClurg and Neu-
man does not support an absolute rule excluding all dividend
income from the scope of s. 56(2), Dickson C.J.C.'s analysis of
the third precondition in McClurg provides a more convincing
reason for a "general rule" according to which dividends are "nor-
mally beyond the scope" of this provision. lOB Since s. 56(2) "reason-
ably cannot have been intended to cover benefits conferred for
adequate consideration'in the context of a legitimate business rela-
tionship",I09 it follows that the provision should not apply to the
declaration and payment of dividends in the context of ordinary
commercial relationships between arm's length parties. Nor should
it apply to dividends paid to a non-arm's length shareholder who has
provided adequate consideration for the shares in the context of a
legitimate business relationship. Consequently, as Dickson C.J.C.
105. McClurg, supra, footnote 6, at pp. 183-84.
106. Neuman, supra, footnote 10, at p. 190. Iacobucci J.'s decision does not, however,
consider the decision in Bronfman.
107. Ibid., atp. 191.
108. McClurg, supra, footnote 6, at pp. 184 and 185.
109. Ibid., at p. 184.
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concludes, "as a general rule, a dividend payment cannot reasonably
be considered a benefit diverted from a taxpayer to a third party
within the contemplation of s. 56(2)".llO
In contrast, where discretionary dividends are paid as part of an
income-splitting arrangement to a non-arm's length shareholder in
an amount greatly exceeding the consideration for the shares when
issued and any other contribution which might justify the payment
of such a dividend as a legitimate quid pro quo, it is reasonable to
regard the payment as a benefit which the shareholder or share-
holders directing or concurring in the payment desired to confer
upon the recipient. In these circumstances, it follows, application
of s. 56(2) is consistent not only with the text of the provision but
with its accepted purposes both "to capture and attribute to the
reassessed taxpayer 'receipts which he or she otherwise would
have obtained'''111 and "to prevent tax avoidance through income
splitting".112
For this reason, moreover, Dickson C.J.C.'s suggestion in
McClurg that s. 56(2) might apply to the payment of a discretion-
ary dividend to a non-arm's length shareholder who has made no
contribution to the company paying the dividend is best understood
not as an exception to the entitlement requirement included in the
fourth precondition (since this entitlement may be prospective or
indirect), but as an expression of the third precondition that the
payment or transfer of property benefit the reassessed taxpayer or
some other person upon whom the reassessed taxpayer desired
to confer a benefit. Although a purposive analysis of this third
precondition-supports a "general rule" according to which dividend
payments are "normally beyond the scope of s. 56(2)",113 this rule
does not extend to circumstances in which the payment of a dividend
may reasonably be regarded as a benefit within the meaning of this
provision.
On this account, fmally, Iacobucci J.'s objections in Neuman to
Dickson C.J.C.'s obiter dicta as an unwarranted exception to the
general rule excluding dividend income from the scope of s. 56(2)
are ultimately misplaced. Without a direct or immediate entitle-
ment requirement to the fourth precondition, the payment of a
1l0. Ibid. (emphasis added).
llI. Neuman, supra, footnote 10, at p. 190, citing McClurg, supra, footnote 6, at pp. 183-
84.
112. Neuman, ibid., at p. 187.
113. McClurg, supra, footnote 6, at pp. 184 and 185.
dividend may be subject to attribution under s. 56(2) where it
benefits the reassessed taxpayer or another person upon whom the
reas~e~sed taxpayer desired to confer a benefit. To suggest that this
provlSlon may apply to the payment of a discretionary dividend to
a non-arm's length shareholder who has made no contribution to
the company paying the dividend, therefore, neither "ignores the
~nd~ental nature of dividends" nor draws an inappropriate dis-
tinction between arm's length and non-arm's length transactions. ll4
On the contrary, it merely illustrates an obvious factual circum-
stance, exemplified by the transactions in Neuman in which the
payment of a dividend might reasonably be regard~d as a benefit
within the meaning of s. 56(2).
3. Consequential Analysis
. In addition t? textual and purposive analysis, courts often con-
slde~ the pract1cal. consequences of different interpretations, re-
gardmg th~se consl~ered fair and reasonable more favourably than
those conSIdered unjust or unreasonable. IIS The traditional "golden
rul~", for example, has -long allowed courts to depart from the
plarn words of a statute in order to avoid "absurd" or "anomalous"
results. ll6 In the interpretation of the Income Tax Act, the Supreme
Court of <;anada ha~ often employed consequential analysis to sup-
port one mterpretatIOn over another. 1I7 Likewise in McClurg and
Neuman, t~e S~preme C~urt of Canada considered the consequences
of altematlve mterpretatlons to justify a rule excluding dividends
from the scope of s. 56(2).
In McClurg, for example, Dickson C.J. reasoned that if s. 56(2)
were to apply to dividend income, "corporate directors potentially
114. Neuman, supra, footnote 10, at pp. 192-94.
115. On. the role of consequential analysis in statutoI}' interpretation see Ruth Sullivan,
Drzedger on the Construction of Statutes, 3rd ed (Toronto, "Butterworths, 1994) at
pp.79-99.
116. See, e.g., Gre~ v. Pearson (~857), 10 E:R. 1216 (H.L.), per Lord Wensleydale, stating
(at p. 12) that the grammatical and ordinary sense of wOrds is to be adhered to unless
that w~)Uld lead to.some: absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest
of the I~strument, In whic.h case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may
be m~dJf'ie<!, so as to. aVOId t!Jat absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther". See also
~e dlscu~slon of thIS rule In the context of Canadian income tax cases in Duff,
Interpreting the Income Tax Act - Part I: Interpretive Doctrines," supra footnote 76
at pp. 480-82. ' ,
117. See the section on "Consequential Analysis" in Duff, "Interpreting the Income Tax
Act - Part II: Towards a Pragmatic Approach", supra, footnote 71.
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could be found liable for the tax consequences of any declaration
of dividends to a third party", explaining that this result "would
violate fundamental principles of corporate law and the realities of
commercial practice and would 'overshoot' the legislative purpose
of the section".118 For these same reasons, Iacobucci 1. concluded in
Neuman that the exclusion of dividend income from the scope of
s. 56(2) "is the only interpretation which makes sense and which
avoids absurdity in the application of s. 56(2)".u9In addition, Iaco-
bucci J. suggested, if s. 56(2) were to apply to discretionary divi-
dends paid to non-arm's length shareholders who do not make a
"legitimate contribution" to the company paying the dividends,
courts might face a "difficult task of determining what constitutes
a legitimate contribution".120 Finally, as others have argued, the
application of s. 56(2) to dividend income could produce double
taxation, with the same dividends taxed both in the hands of the
reassessed taxpayer and the other person to whom they are paid.121
While the first of these consequential arguments would, if estab-
lished, constitute a powerful objection to the application of s. 56(2)
to dividend income, the purposive analysis of the previous section
suggests· that it exaggerates the potential scope of s. 56(2) by
ignoring the third element necessary to its application: that the
payment or transfer of property at issue be for the taxpayer's own
benefit or the benefit of some other person upon whom the tax-
payer desired to confer a benefit. As explained earlier, since
s.· 56(2) "reasonably cannot have been intended to cover benefits
conferred for adequate consideration in the context ofa legitimate
business relationship", 122 it should not apply to dividend payments
made in the context of ordinary commercial relationships between
arm's length parties. As a result, if dividend income were subject to
s. 56(2), it does not follow that "corporate directors potentially could
be found liable for the tax consequences of any declaration of
dividends to a third party".123 Consequently, the exclusion of divi-
dend income from the scope of s. 56(2) is not "the only interpretation
118. McClurg, supra, footnote 6, at p. 184.
119. Neuman, supra, footnote 10, at p. 190.
120. Ibid., at p. 193.
121. See, e.g., Chemiawsky and Toy, supra, footnote 7, at p. 25.
122. McClurg, supra, footnote 6, at p. 184.
123. Ibid.
which makes sense and which avoids absurdity in the application of
s. 56(2)".124 c
On the contrary, by excluding virtually all dividend income
from the scope of s. 56(2), the decision in Neuman produces conse-
quences at o~ds both with the scheme of the Act and basic princi-
ples of tax faIrness. Although it is true, as Iacobucci J. observes in
Neuman, that the ITA contains "no general scheme to prevent income
splitting",125 it is also true that the ITA contains several specific rules
de~igned to prevent income splitting,l26 reflecting "an underlying
philosophy that a taxpayer should not be able to divert income to
another taxpayer for the purposes of reducing his or her marginal
r~te of.tax."12? ~o, the extent that Neuman sanctions the payment of
discretIOnary diVIdends for the sole purpose of income splitting,
therefore, it contradicts this "underlying philosophy". To the extent
that this kind of income splitting is most likely to be conducted by a
rat~er select category of well-advised taxpayers with private corpo-
ratIons, moreover, Neuman undermines basic principles of tax fair.,
ness by allowing these taxpayers to minimize their tax burdens in a
manner that is largely unavailable to the vast majority of taxpayers.
As for Iacobucci J.'s second consequential argument that courts
could face a "difficult task determining the existence of a legiti-
mate contribution", this concern is also exaggerated.. Since the
existence of a legitimate contribution is relevant only where discre-
~ionary ,dividends are paid in an amount greatly exceeding the
Issue pnce of the shares on which the dividends are paid, the need
to consider this issue is likely to be confined to a relatively small
number of cases, such as McClurg, where transactions which
~ght otherwise be ,considered to have been designed to split
Income are charactenzed as "the product of a bona fide business
r~lati~:ms~p".128 In ad~tion, the determination of a "legitimate con-
trIbutIon IS no more difficult than the assessment of other standards
such as fair market consideration which appear in other ITA provi-
sions designed to prevent income splitting. 129 In .any event, to the
124. Neuman, supra, footnote 10, at p. 190.
125. Ibid., at p. 187 (C.T.C.), citing Krishna and VanDuzer, supra, footnote 29, at p. 367.
126. In addition to s. 56(2), see ITASS. 56(4) to (4.3), s. 67, s. 69(1), and ss, 74.1 to 75.1.
127. Krishna and VanDuzer, supra, footnote 29, at p. 367. While the ITA contains specific
exceptio~s to the attributi~m rules, these exceptions are generally limited (e.g., to
penSIOn Income) and specifically defined (e.g., transfers or loans to small business
corporations which are exempt from the attribution rule in s. 74.4).
128. McClurg, supra, footnote 6, at p. 185.
129. See s. 74.5 (1) ofthe ITA, which excludes transfers for fair market consideration from
the attribution rules in s. 74.1 (1) and (2) and s. 74.2. See also s. 69(1 )(a), which deems
taxpayers who acquire anything from non-arm's length persons at an amount in excess
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extent that s. 56(2) requires the existence of a "benefit" to the
reassessed taxpayer or other person to whom the property Oat issue is
paid or transferred, the need to determine whether this payment or
transfer is "the product of a business contract made for adequate
consideration"13o is mandated both by the words of the Act and the
purpose of the provision. For the court to resist this task because it
is "difficult" is to ignore its responsibility to apply the provisions of
the Act.
With respect to the third consequential argument that the appli-
cation of s. 56(2) could result in double taxation, two responses
are in orderYI First, to the extent that the dividend payment is
calculated to produce no tax liability to the recipient, as appears to
have been the case in Neuman where the dividend income was
sheltered by the dividend tax credit and Mrs. Neuman's personal
exemption, there is no double taxation. Indeed, to the extent that
discretionary dividends are designed to split income with low-in-
come spouses or children, the actual recipient is likely to pay little
or no tax on the dividend income. Second, since other attribution
rules specifically deem amounts to have been received by the trans-
feror of property and not the actual recipient,132 the absence of such
language in s.056(2) and other rules designed to prevent income
of its fair market value to have acquired it at that fair market value; s. 69(l)(b), which
deems taxpayers who dispose of anything to non-arm's length persons for no proce°eds
or for proceeds less than its fair market value to have received proceeds equal to that
fair market value; and s. 67, which limits the amount that may be deducted in respect
of an outlay or expense to the extent that the outlay or expense was "reasonable in the
circumstances".
130. McClurg, supra, footnote 6, at p. 185.
131. The issue of double taxation in the application of s. 56(2) was considered in Outer-
bridge Estate, supra, footnote 6, and Ascot Enterprises v. The Queen, [1996] 1 C.T.C.
384, 96 D.T.C. 6015 (F.C.A.), neither of which involved the payment ofdividends. In
Outerbridge Estate, at pp. 117-18, the court adopted a "fifth precondition" to the
application ofs. 56(2), which was subsequently rejected by the Federal Court ofAppeal
in Neuman, according to which: "the validity of an assessment under s. 56(2) of the
Act when the taxpayer had himself no entitlement to the payment made or the property
transferred is subject to an implied condition, namely that the payee or transferee not
be subject to tax on the benefit he received". In Ascot Enterprises, the court rejected
the argument that s. 56(2) permits double taxation, responding at p. 389 that: "Double
taxation exists where a single payment is taxed twice in the hands of the same
taxpayer" (emphasis added). Nonetheless, acknowledging that "the application of
s. 56(2) may lead to harsh consequences", it concluded that courts should interpret the
provision in such a way that they not "infer too hastily" that a taxpayer has desired to
confer a benefit on another person in cases "where the motive is not obvious". While
the latter approach is consistent with the text of s. 56(2), the words of this provision
provide no support for the addition of a fifth precondition.
132. See ITA ss. 74.1(1) and (2), 74.2(1), and 75.1(1).
splitting suggests that this result may not be unintended. I33 Although
a general presumption against double taxation is consistent with the
emphasis that this section places on the role of consequential analy-
sis in statutory interpretation, an application of this or any other
consequentialist presumption should be supported by the text of the
statute or clear evidence of legislative intent. Otherwise, as Iaco-
bucci J. himself emphasized in another leading tax case, "a norma-
tive assessment of the consequences of the application of a given
provision is within the ambit of the legislature, not the courts". 134
4. Conclusion
While a purposive analysis of s. 56(2) supports a general rule,
such as that in McClurg, according to which dividend payments
are "normally beyond the scope of s. 56(2)",135 neither the text of
the provision nor its purpose nor consequential considerations sup-
port an absolute rule, such as that adopted in Neuman, according to
which s. 56(2) cannot apply to any dividends except those to which.
a reassessed taxpayer had a preexisting entitlement. 136 As a result, it
follows that the basis of the Neuman decision, ° that s. 56(2) could
not apply to the dividends paid to Mrs. Neuman, cannot be sustained.
On the contrary, to the extent that this payment satisfied each of the
four preconditions to the application of s. 56(2), a share of the
dividend payment based on his percentage shareholding in Melru
should have been attributed to Mr Neuman. 137
IV. IMPLICATIONS
Although this comment argues that Neuman was wrongly de-
cided, the decision stands as an authoritative statement of the
law by the Supreme Court of Canada. This part considers the
implications of the decision and subsequent legislative amend-
ments for income splitting, tax avoidance, and statutory interpreta-
tion.
133. In addition to s.56(2), see also ss.67, s. 69(1) and 74.4, each of which permit the
taxation of the same amount in the hands of two taxpayers.
134. Antosko v. The Queen, supra, footnote 37, at p. 33.
135. McClurg, supra, footnote 6, at p. 185.
136. Neuman, supra footnote 10, at p. 191.
137. Note that this result would have differed from the Minister's reassessment, which
attributed the entire amount of the dividend to Mr Neuman. In so doing, the Minister
appears to have ignored the prospective or indirect entitlement requirement that is
properly included in the fourth precondition.
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1. Income Splitting
As indicated earlier, the ITA contains several specific rules de-
signed to prevent income splitting,138 reflecting "an underlying phi-
losophy that a taxpayer should not be able to divert income to
another taxpayer for the purposes of reducing his or her marginal
rate of tax" .139 While the ITA contains specific exceptions to the
attribution rules, these exceptions are limited to specific kinds of
transfers, such as the assignment of Canada or Quebec Pension Plan
benefits to a spouse,140 contributions to spousal RRSpS,141 or transfers
or loans to small business corporations. 142 On the other hand, the
attribution rules are notoriously easy to avoid, applying for example
to income from property transferred or lent to a spouse or minor
childl43 but not income from a business the capital of which is
provided by a spouse or parent,l44 and to capital gains on property
lent or transferred to a spousel45 but not capital gains on property
lent or transferred to a minor child. l46 To the extent that Neuman
sanctions the use of discretionary dividends to split income, there-
fore, the decision simply adds another technique to the numerous
methods already employed to circumvent the ITA's various attribu-
tion rules. 147
138. In addition to s. 56(2), see ITAs. 56(4) to (4.3), ss.67, s. 69(1), and 74.1 to 75.1.
139. Krishna and VanDuzer, supra, footnote 29, at p. 367.
140. This exception appears in ITA ss. 56(2) and ~4) and 74.1(1). . .
141. See ITA s. 146(5.1) and (8.3), which pernut a taxpayer to deduct contnbutlons to a
spouse's RRSP provided that these amounts are not withdrawn for at least two y~ars ..
142. See ITA s. 74.4, which exempts these transfers or loans from the corporate attributIon
rule otherwise set out in the provision.
143. ITA, s. 74.1(1) and (2). .
144. See Robins v. M.N.R., [1963] C.T.C. 27 atp. 30,63 D.T.C. 1012 (Exch. Ct.), concluding
that "... what is deemed to be the income of the transferor, and it is clearly stated, is
income from property only. Indeed there is no mention ofinco~e from ~ business.s~ch
as we have here and therefore, this section can be of no assIstance 10 deternumng
whether the business' profit resulting from the real estate transactions is taxable as
income of the appellant or of his wife." For a critical commentary on this decision, see
Gwyneth McGregor, "Interpretation of Taxing Stat,utes: ~ther C~nada?". (1968),.16
Can. Tax 1. 122 at p. 132, commenting that "The IOtentlon of Parliament 10 enacting
this provision is crystal clear; but that did not prevent the Exchequer Court. : . from
... interpreting the section literally and strictly ... with the result of frustrating that
intention."
145. ITA, s. 74.2(1).
146. An exception to this rule exists where farm property is transferred to a minor child on
a tax-deferred basis under s. 73(3) or (4). See ITA s. 75.1.
147. For a detailed discussion of income-splitting techniques, see Cherniawsky and Toy,
supra, footnote 7.
Although Revenue Canada may have lost in Neuman, however,
other statutory provisions may permit different kinds of challenges
to corporate share capital structures designed to split income.
Under s.74.4, for example, a taxpayer who loans or transfers
property to a corporation for the purpose of reducing his or her
income and benefiting a spouse or minor child may be deemed to
receive interest computed at a prescribed rate on the outstanding
amount of the loan or transferred property.148 Although this provi-
sion did not apply to the years at issue in Neuman, it could apply to
similar arrangements where a taxpayer loans or transfers property to
a corporation for the purpose of splitting income.
Alternatively, where shares of a closely held company are issued
for less than their fair market value to a spouse or minor child of a
controlling shareholder, s.74.1(1) or (2) may apply to attribute
dividends on these shares back to the controlling shareholder on
the grounds that he or she transferred property indirectly to the
spouse or minor child. 149 Likewise, in these circumstances, s. 69(1)
may apply to deem the controlling shareholder to have disposed of
an economic interest in the company for proceeds equal t9 its fair
market value. 150 While it is difficult to determine the fair market
value of shares entitled to discretionary dividends, the payment of
dividends in an amount greatly exceeding their issue price not long
after their issuance may suggest that the shares were issued for
consideration less than their fair market value.
As a final possibility, Revenue Canada might invoke the general
anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) in s. 245 on the grounds that the issu-
ance of shares to a spouse or minor child and/or the payment of
discretionary dividends constitutes an avoidance transaction within
the meaning of s. 245(3),151 resulting in a misuse of ITA provisions
148. This provision is explained more fully supra, footnote 32.
149. See, e.g., Kieboom v. M.N.R., [1992] 2 C.T.C. 59, 92 D.T.C. 6382 (ECA) and Romkey
v. The Queen, [1997] 3 C.T.C. 2405 (T.C.C.). .
150. See Kieboom, ibid. For an opposing view on the application of s.69(1) 10 these
circumstances, see Shepp v. The Queen, [1999] 1 C.T.C. 2889, 99 D.T.C. 510 (T.C.C.).
151. According to this provision, an avoidance transaction is defined as a transaction or
series of transactions that, but for the GAAR, "would result, directly or indirectly, in a
tax benefit, unless the transaction may reasonably be considered to have been under-
taken or arranged primarily for bonafide purposes other than to obtain the tax benefit".
Section 245(1) defines a tax benefit as "a reduction, avoidance or deferral of tax or
other amount payable under this Act or an increase in a refund of tax or other amount
under this Act".
14--32 C.Bl.J.
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or an abuse of the ITA as a whole as required by s. 245(4).152 Although
at least one commentator concludes that the court's observation in
Neuman that the ITA contains "no general schemeto prevent income
splitting"153 suggests that income-splitting arrangements are unlikely
to constitute a "misuse" or "abuse" within the meaning· of
s. 245(4),154 the existence of "an underlying philosophy that a tax-
payer should not be able to divert income to another taxpayer for
the purposes of reducing his or her marginal rate of tax"155 makes
this conclusion uncertain. Likewise, although it is arguable that the
GAAR should not apply to income-splitting arrangements that are not
caught by specific anti-avoidance rules directed at these arrange-
ments;156 this interpretive principle should apply only where the
specific attribution rule explicitly exempts a particular form of in-
come splitting. 15? Nonetheless, Revenue Canada appears to have
concluded that the GAAR would not apply to "Neuman-type income-
splitting arrangements". 158
Notwithstanding these existing rules, moreover the federal gov-
ernment has indicated a willingness to amend the ITA to limit some
of the income-splitting opportunities otherwise made possible by the
152. According to this provision, the GAAR "does not apply to a transaction where it may
reasonably be considered that the transaction would not result directly or indirectly in
a misuse of the provisions of this Act or an abuse having regard to the provisions of
this Act, other than this section, read as a whole".
153. Neuman, supra, footnote 10, at p. 187, citing Krishna and VanDuzer, supra, footnote
29, at p. 367.
154. Stephen W. Bowman, "Corporate Income Splitting Revisited: The. Supreme Court
Speaks" (1998), 46 Can. Tax J. 645 at p. 650. See also Krishna and VanDuzer, ibid., at
pp.366-67, arguing that it would "be difficult for the Minister to establish that [an
income-splitting] arrangement misuses a specific provision of the Act or that it is an
abuse of the Act read as a whole".
155. Krishna and VanDuzer, ibid., at p. 367.
156. See, e.g., Guy Fortin, "Abuse or Misuse", in Report of the Proceedings of the Forty-
Ninth Tax Conference, 1997 Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation,
1998), 5:1-22 at p.3, citing a factum in Outerbridge Estate, supra, footnote 6, at
p. 116, in which the court agreed with the taxpayer's view that: .
There is a natural order to the provisions of the Income TaxAct, with technical rules
... at the base, specific anti-avoidance rul<:s like s. 56(2) one level higher, and the
general anti-avoidance rule in section 245 at the apex. As a matter of assessment
practice, a specific anti-avoidance rule should be resorted to only when a particular
transaction is not caught by any technical rule, just as the general anti-avoidance
rule should not be invoked except in the absence of a specific anti-avoidance rule.
157. See, e.g., T.E. McDonnell, "Tax Avoidance: Split(ting) Decision - Part 2" (1991), 39
Can. Tax J. 637 at p. 643, explaining that "the use of a discretionary dividend clause in
a case involving a small business corporation should not be regarded as an abuse of
the Act in view of the express provisions" of s. 74.4 allowing income splitting through
transfers of property to small business corporations.
158. Revenue Canada, Income Tax Technical News, no. 16 (March 8, 1999).
decision in Neuman. Explaining that "recent case law has provided
support for income-splitting techniques contrary to policy intent",
the 1999 Federal Budget announced the introduction of "a targeted
measure to discourage incomec splitting with minor children".159
According to the budget, this new measure will involve a special
"income-splitting tax" applying the top marginal tax rate instead of
the normal graduated rates to certain kinds of income, including
taxable dividends of private companies received by individuals
under the age of 18.160
Most interestingly, this proposal suggests an implicit policy
decision to permit the use of discretionary dividends to split in-
come with a spouse but not minor children. Indee.d, "such a policy
may be justified on the grounds that adult spouses obtain effective
control over the income to which they are legally entitled, making"
it properly taxable in their hands, while minor children are unlikely
to exert effective control over income which they receive pursuant
to an income-splitting arrangement.161 If this is the case, however,
there is no justification for other spousal attribution rules, which
should be repealed to permit spousal income splitting where legal
title to income is effectively transferred. Where property is trans-
ferred to minor children, however, the logic of the new income-
splitting tax suggests a more vigorous response than the current
attribution rules, which apply to income from property lent or trans-
ferred to a related minor but not capital gainS. 162 One alternative, not
unlike that employed in the United States, would be to tax all
unearned income of" minor children at the marginal rate of tax
applicable to the income of one or the other parent.l63 This approach
would be much simpler to administer than the current attribution
rules, which require property to be traced to an attributable trans-
feror, and is consistent with a plausible assumption that minor chil-
dren exert little effective control over passive income which is not
the product of their own efforts.
159. Martin, The Budget Plan 1999, supra, footnote 11, at p. 193. "
160. In order to prevent double taxation, income that is subject to this income-splitting tax
will be deductible in computing the individual's taxable income subject to the ordinary
income tax.
161. For an excellent discussion of this control concept and its implications for policy
decisions regarding the tax unit and income splitting, see Lawrence Zelenak, "Marriage
and the Income Tax" (1994), 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 339.
162. See supra, footnotes 143 and 146 and accompanying text.
163. See s. 1(g) of the Internal Revenue Code, which taxes certain unearned income of
minor children at the parents' marginal rate.
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2. Tax Avoidance
Beyond its specific application to income splitting, Neuman
constitutes an important statement by the Supreme Court of Can-
ada on judicial approaches to tax avoidance and anti-avoidance
rules. First, as Iacobucci J. affIrmed in the last of his general
observations, "taxpayers can arrange their affairs in a particular
way for the sole purpose of deliberately availing themselves of tax
reduction devices in the ITA".I64 Second, he explained, "non-arm's
length arrangements can also be created for the sole purpose of
taking advantage of tax reduction devices".165 Finally, he suggested,
where the Minister relies on a specific anti-avoidance rule like
s. 56(2), the provision can apply only where the statutory require-
ments to its application are "specifically met". 166
Although practitioners are likely to welcome the first and second
of these comments as a reaffirmation of the traditional principle
that "[e]very man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so as that
the tax attaching under the appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise
would be",167 a note of caution is in order. Since the enactment of
the GAAR was specifically intended to limit this principle,168 the
court's affirmation of this principle may be limited by the fact that
the GAAR did not apply to the years at issue in Neuman. On the other
hand, as one commentator has suggested, if the court's comments
foreshadow its approach to the GAAR, "they suggest an extremely
narrow interpretation".169
A similar comment may be made with respect to the court's
observation that s. 56(2) can apply only where the various require-
ments to its application are "specifically met". Although directed
at the interpretation of s. 56(2), this statement may suggest a more
164. Neuman, supra, footnote 10, atp. 188.
165. Ibid.
166. Ibid., at p. 187.
167. The Commissioners ofInland Revenue, [1936] A.C. 1 (H.L.) atp. 19,perLord Tomlin.
For an example of this enthusiasm, see Catherine A. Brayley, "Life Pending Neuman"
in Report of the Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Tax Conference, 1997 Conference
Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1998), 15:1-21 at p. 21.
168. See Department of Finance, Income Tax Refonn 1987 (June 18, 1987), reproduced in
White Paper on Tax Refonn (Don Mills, CCH, 1987), p. 95 at p. 211, signalling a
"change in direction" involving the introduction of a new general anti-avoidance rule
"intended to strike a balance between taxpayers' need for certainty in planning their
affairs and the government's responsibility to protect the tax base and the fairness of
the tax system" by "establish[ing] limits to acceptable tax avoidance".
169. Daniel Sandler, "A Wake for McClurg Dicta" (1998), 6 Can. Tax Highlights 41.
general view according to which specific anti-avoidance rules
should be construed narrowly in favoUfof the taxpayer. If so, this
statement would appear to contradict the modem trend against
strict construction of taxing statutes.170
3. Statutory Interpretation
With respect to statutory interpretation more generally, the
court's approach in Neuman is curious. Although recent tax cases
have placed primary emphasis on the words of the statutory text,
whether in the form of the "plain meaning rule" or the ''words-in-
total-context approach",17l the interpretive approll:ch to which the
court refers in Neuman is largely purposive or teleological, empha-
sizing the purpose of s. 56(2) much· more than the words of· the'
provision. Moreover, by considering the practical consequences of
alternative interpretations, the court acknowledges a category of
relevant considerations that is absent from any of the interpretive
doctrines to which the court actually refers. 172 In this respect, as I
have argued elsewhere, the court's interpretive approach is implic-
itly pragmatic, considering a variety of relevant factors including
the practical consequences of different interpretations in addition to
170. The traditional rule according to which taxing statutes should be strictly constr:u~ in
favour of the taxpayer was questioned in Stubart, supra, footnote 37, and deciSively
rejected in Golden v. The Queen, [1986] 1 C.T.C. 274 at p.277, 86 D.T.C. 6138
(S.C.C.), stating that: "strict construction in the historic sense no longer finds a place
in the canons of interpretation applicable to taxation statutes". On the decline of strict
construction, see Duff, "Interpreting the Income TaxAct - Part I: Interpretive Doctrines"
supra, footnote 76, at pp. 482-85.
171. See, e.g., Antosko v. The Queen, supra, footnote 37, at p. 31, perlacobucci J., stating
that: "While it is true that the courts must view discrete sections of the Income TaxAct
in light of the other provisions of the Act and of the purpose of the l.egislation, and ~at
they must analyze a given transaction in the context of econormc and commercial
reality, such techniques cannot alter the result where the words of the statute are clear
and plain and where the legal and practical effect of the transaction is undisputed"; and
Alberta (Treasury Branches) v. The Queen, [1996] 1 C.T.C. 395 at pp. 403-404, 96
D.T.C. 6245 (S.C.C.), per Cory J., affirming a "words-in-total-context apprpach"
giving priority to the words of the statutory text but affirming th~t "in orde~ to
determine the clear and plain meaning ofthe statute it is always appropnate to conSider
the 'scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament'''. For a
detailed review of these doctrines and leading tax cases in which they have been
applied, see Duff, "Interpreting the Income Tax Act - Part I: Interpretive Doctrines"
supra, footnote 76, at pp. 504-32. .
172. Neither the plain meaning rule, nor the teleological approach, no~ the W~rdS-lI~-tO~­
context approach make explicit reference to the role of consequential considerations In
statutory interpretation.
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the text of the Act, the scheme of the Act, the purpose of the Act,
and the intentions of the legislature. 173
Notwithstanding this apparent pragmatism, however, it is argu-
able that the court's strict approach to the interpretation of s. 56(2)
was shaped less by its purposive and consequential analyses, the
conclusions of which are questionable in any event,174 than by a
traditional presumption, reflected in its view that this provision can
apply only where its terms are "specifically met",175 that tax statutes
should be strictly construed in favour of the taxpayer. If this is so,
the decision is as troubling for the interpretation of tax statutes
generally as it is for the interpretation of specific anti-avoidance
rules and the GAAR. While strict construction of taxing statutes has
a lengthy history in Canadian tax law,176 it has been sharply criticized
by academics and practitioners alike,177 and explicitly rejected by
the Supreme Court of Canada on several occasions. 178 To restore
such a presumption implicitly would be to ignore these criticisms
and reverse these decisions without even so much as an argument.
v. CONCLUSIONS
Notwithstanding the many concerns that this article has ex-
pressed regarding the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Neu-
man, practitioners are likely to welcome the decision on the
173. Duff, ''Interpreting the Income TaxAct - Part I: Interpretive Doctrines", supra, footnote
76. For a more general discussion of this implicit pragmatism in Supreme Court of
Canada decisions involving the interpretation of statutory provisions, see Ruth Sulli-
van, "Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court of Canada" (1998-99), 30 Ottawa
L. Rev. 175.
174. See the analysis at supra, footnotes 85 to 134 and accompanying text.
175. Neuman, supra, footnote 10, at p. 187.
176. See the discussion of strict construction in Duff, "Interpreting the Income Tax Act -
Part I: Interpretive Doctrines", supra, footnote 76, at pp. 469-85.
177. See, e.g., John Willis, "Statute Interpretation in a NutsheU" (1938),16 Can. Bar Rev. 1
at pp. 25-27; W. Friedmann, "Statute Law and Its Interpretation in the Modem State"
(1948),26 Can. Bar Rev. 1277 at pp. 1298-299; Douglas J. Sherbaniuk, "Tax Avoid-
ance - Recent Developments," in Report of the Proceedings of the Twenty-First Tax
Conference, 1968 Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1969),
p. 430; and Stephen Bowman, "Interpretation of Tax Legislation: The Evolution of
Purposive Analysis" (1995), 43 Can. Tax J. 1167. These arguments are reviewed in
Duff, ''Interpreting the Income Tax Act - Part II: Towards a Pragmatic Approach",
supra, footnote 71.
178. See, e.g., Golden v. The Queen, supra, footnote 170, at p. 277; Bronfrnan Trust v. The
Queen, [1987] 1 C.T.C. 117 at p. 128, 87 D.T.C. 5059 (S.C.c.); McClurg, supra,
footnote 6, at pp. 182-83; Corporation Notre-Dame de Bon-Secours v. Quebec, supra
footnote 87, at p. 249; and Schwartz v. The Queen, [1996] 1 C.T.C. 303 at p. 331, 96
D.T.C. 6103 (S.C.C.).
grounds that it has eliminated much of the uncertainty created by
McClurg, reaffIrmed the traditional principle that taxpayers may
arrange their affairs for the sole purpose of avoiding tax, adopted
a strict approach to the interpretation of specific anti-avoidance
provisions and opened the door to sophisticated income-splitting
techniques through the use of discretionary dividends. While the
ITA contains other provisions that may be applied to challenge these
income-splitting arrangements, it remains to be seen whether the
Minister will attempt to invoke these rules, and how the courts will
respond to these efforts. To the extent that Neuman signals a broad
acceptance of tax avoidance transactions and a narrow approach to
the interpretation of anti-avoidance rules, however, the Minister's
prospects are uncertain.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the federal government has re-
sponded, as it has time and time again since the Income War
Tax Act was enacted in 1917,179 by proposing specific statutory
amendments to reverse judicial decisions "contrary to policy in-
tent".180 Most interestingly, however, by targeting only "those struc-
tures that are primarily put in place to facilitate income splitting
with minors",181 the government appears to have accepted the use of
discretionary dividends to split income with one's spouse. Although
the logic of this policy choice favours the enhancement of attribution
rules for minor children and the repeal of all spousal attribution
rules, it remains to be seen whether the decision in Neuman will
prompt yet further amendments to the scheme of the ITA.
179. S.c. 1917, c. 28.
180. Martin, The Budget Plan 1999, supra, footnote 11, at p. 193.
181. Ibid., at p. 194.
